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Federal Nonreserved Water Rights
In 1978, the Supreme Court decided two cases of fundamental
importance to water law in the western United States. California
v. United States' held that state law governs the distribution of
water from federal reclamation projects. United States v. New
Mexico 2 held that federal reserved water rights3 are not available
for secondary uses such as stock watering or maintaining instream
flows4 for recreation or fish habitats. These decisions limited the
freedom of federal agencies to control water resources without re-
gard for state law.5 In doing so, they lent support to the position
that primary management authority over western waters should be
returned to the states.'
Undaunted, the Solicitor for the Department of the Interior
has asserted the existence of a hitherto unrecognized federal non-
1 438 U.S. 645 (1978).
2 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
' When the federal government reserves land from the public domain, it also implicitly
reserves from appropriation under state law the amount of unappropriated water that is
necessary to accomplish the purpose for which the land was reserved. Cappaert v. United
States, 426 U.S. 128, 138 (1976); see Ranquist, The Winters Doctrine and How It Grew:
Federal Reservation of Rights to the Use of Water, 1975 B.Y.U. L. Rav. 639.
4 An instream flow is water that is "used" by being left in the river. See Kiechel &
Green, Riparian Rights Revisited: Legal Basis for Federal Instream Flow Rights, 16 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 969, 970 n.4 (1976); Tarlock, Appropriation for Instream Flow Maintenance:
A Progress Report on "New" Public Western Water Rights, 1978 UTAH L. REV. 211.
Until recently, it was impossible to appropriate an instrearn flow. 5 .R. CLARK, WATERS AND
WATER RIGHTS § 409.2, at 107-08 (1972). Some states now provide for such appropriation to
protect the natural state of rivers. See, e.g., COLo. Rav. STAT. § 37-92-103(4) (1973).
' For discussion of typical federal agency practice prior to the 1978 cases, see Note,
Water in the Woods: The Reserved-Rights Doctrine and National Forest Lands, 20 STAN.
L. REv. 1187, 1195-98 (1968).
1 Since Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963), which held that the Secretary of the
Interior had the power to allocate waters of the Colorado River among users in Arizona,
California, and Nevada, id. at 580-86, the Court has returned to the states some of the
authority they lost in that case. See Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United
States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976) (approving stay of federal proceedings for determination of re-
served rights in state court); United States v. District Court for Eagle County, 401 U.S. 520
(1971) (no federal sovereign immunity against adjudication of reserved rights in state court).
However, the Court also has expanded the scope of the reserved rights doctrine. See Cap-
paert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976) (reserved rights doctrine not limited to surface
waters but extended to ground waters).
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reserved water right.7 This comment reviews the claim to the non-
reserved water right and analyzes its theoretical foundation.s It
concludes that what is involved is not a right but a power that
Congress has not exercised. The putative right presupposes both a
federal general common law and a nineteenth-century conception
of sovereign federal ownership, neither of which is tenable today.
The United States has no water rights other than reserved rights
and those acquired in conformity with state law. The Solicitor's
position threatens private rights and ignores strong state interests
that have been recognized by Congress and the Court.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CURRENT CONTROVERSY
In United States v. New Mexico,9 the Supreme Court denied
for the first time federal claims of reserved water rights. Prior to
7 Department of the Interior Solicitor's Opinion No. M-36914, Federal Water Rights of
the National Park Service, Fish and Wildlife Service, Bureau of Reclamation and the Bu-
reau of Land Management, 86 Interior Dec. 553 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Solicitor's Opin-
ion]. The Solicitor recently modified the opinion to limit its scope, but reaffirmed its basic
doctrines. See note 29 infra.
8 This comment does not consider possible distinctions between rights concerning
ground and surface waters. In its early development, western water law was concerned pri-
marily with the use of surface waters, and it was in this context that the appropriation
doctrine predominated. Development of groundwater law, on the other hand, was at first
"sporadic and uneven." 5 R. CLARK, supra note 4, § 440, at 407. Courts employed, in addi-
tion to prior appropriation, theories of absolute ownership, reasonable use, and correlative
rights in resolving groundwater disputes. Today, most western states apply the appropria-
tion doctrine to groundwater and regulate its use through statutory permitting systems. Id.
at 412-15.
The Solicitor does not develop the distinction between ground and surface waters in his
argument for a nonreserved right. To the extent that the appropriation doctrine governs
groundwater use, such a distinction is unimportant. The Supreme Court has brushed aside
the difference in a reserved rights case, noting the physical interrelation of the two. Cap-
paert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 142-43 (1976).
This comment also does not address the special problems of Indian water rights. For gen-
eral discussion of these issues, see Abrams, Reserved Water Rights, Indian Rights and the
Narrowing Scope of Federal Jurisdiction: The Colorado River Decision, 30 STAN. L. Rsv.
1111 (1978); Bloom, Indian "Paramount" Rights to Water Use, 16 RocKY MTN. MIN. L.
INsT. 669 (1971); Pelcyger, Indian Water Rights: Some Emerging Frontiers, 21 RocKY MTN.
MIN. L. INsT. 743 (1975); Veeder, Indian Prior and Paramount Rights to the Use of Water,
16 RoCKY MTN. MI. L. INsT. 631 (1971); Comment, Paleface, Redskin, and the Great
White Chiefs in Washington: Drawing the Battle Lines Over Western Water Rights, 17
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 449 (1980). Nor does it consider the scope of the navigation power under
the commerce clause. For a discussion of that issue, see Ericson, The Usurpation Servitude
and Reserved Indian Property: Does the Rule of No Compensation Apply to Indian Inter-
ests in Navigable Waters?, 1979 UTAH L. Rav. 47; Morreale, Federal Power in Western
Waters: The Navigation Power and the Rule of No Compensation, 3 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1
(1963).
9 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
The University of Chicago Law Review
this decision, the Court had consistently interpreted the doctrine
of federal reserved water rights expansively, recognizing and grant-
ing all rights claimed by the United States.10 Specifically, the
Court held that the United States, in reserving the Gila National
Forest from the public lands, had reserved only enough water to
accomplish the purposes for which the land was originally with-
drawn.1 These purposes were "to preserve the timber [and] to se-
cure favorable water flows for private and public uses under state
law.' 112 Although the Forest Service is authorized under subse-
quent legislation to use National Forest lands in other ways, s such
secondary purposes do not have a reserved water right.14 To ac-
quire water for secondary purposes, the Forest Service must apply
to the states pursuant to their laws. 5
Western states viewed this decision as significantly increasing
state control of "their"1 " water. Recognition of the federal claims
for reserved rights predicated on secondary purposes, it was
thought, would have threatened the displacement of private rights
held under state law.18 Academic commentators, on the other
10 E.g., Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976) (extended to groundwater); Ari-
zona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963) (extended to non-Indian reservations); Winters v.
United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908) (applied for first time to Indian reservation). The Court's
only rulings against the United States were on procedural or jurisdictional grounds. E.g.,
Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976); United
States v. District Court for Eagle County, 401 U.S. 520 (1971); United States v. District
Court for Water Div. No. 5, 401 U.S. 527 (1971).
1 438 U.S. at 700, 702.
"Id. at 718 (emphasis added).
13 Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960, 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531 (1976).
14 438 U.S. at 713-15. Authorized secondary purposes include stock watering, wildlife
and fish conservation, and recreation. 16 U.S.C. § 528 (1976).
25 438 U.S. at 716. It has been argued that the Court's holding governs only the particu-
lar secondary purposes that were at issue in the case before it, and not all secondary pur-
poses that might arise under federal legislation. See Fairfax & Tarlock, No Water for the
Woods: A Critical Analysis of United States v. New Mexico, 15 IDAHO L. Rav. 509 (1979).
10 All western states assert that water found within the state is state property or that it
belongs to the public. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. 14, § 1; CAL. WATER CODE § 102 (West
1971); COLO. CONsT. art. XVI, § 5; MONT. RaV. CODES ANN. § 85-2-101 (1979); Wyo. CONST.
art. VIH, § 1; Wyo. STAT. 41-3-115 (1977). See also 1 R. CLARK, supra note 4, § 39.3 (stat-
utes declaring that water use is public).
17 See In New Mexico, Water is Valuable Resource-And So Is Water Boss, Wall St.
J., May 1, 1980, at 1, coL 1. "'Every attorney for the twelve states we represent considers
this a historic ruling and a strong finding for states' rights,' says Jack Barrett, executive
director of the Western States Water Council." Id. at 22, col 4. The Council is a water
policy group composed of representatives appointed by governors of the western states.
18 See Brief for Amici Curiae Twin Lakes Reservoir & Canal Co. and Southeastern
Colo. Water Conservation Dist. at 4, United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978);
Boles & Elliott, United States v. New Mexico and the Course of Federal Reserved Water
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hand, generally were critical of the Court's construction of the acts
under which National Forests are created.19 Several, like the dis-
sent,20 dismissed as mere dictum the Court's statement that the
sole exception to state control of western water is the federal re-
served right. 1 More significantly, the Solicitor for the Department
of the Interior reacted to the New Mexico decision by asserting the
existence of a federal nonreserved water right.22 The Solicitor's
Opinion maintains that this right "arises from actual use of unap-
propriated water by the United States to carry out congressionally-
authorized management objectives on federal lands. 23 In the exer-
cise of this right, compliance with state law, although desirable, is
not required. 4
Proponents of complete state control of water rights objected
strenuously to the Solicitor's Opinion. The Western States Water
Council 25 and the General Counsel of the New Mexico Water Re-
sources Division26 criticized it as an attempt to circumvent the
holding in United States v. New Mexico and revive the claim to a
federal water right independent of state law. In response to this
opposition, the Secretary of the Interior promised governors of
western states that the relevant portions of the Solicitor's Opinion
would be, in effect, set aside.2 He also directed his subordinates to
Rights, 51 COLO. L. REv. 209 (1980).
"' See, e.g., Fairfax & Tarlock, supra note 15; Comment, United States v. New Mexico:
Purposes That Hold No Water, 22 Am. L. RIv. 19 (1980); Note, United States v. New
Mexico: The Beginning of a Trend Toward Favoring State Water Rights Over Federal
Water Rights, 9 Naw Max. L. REv. 361 (1979); Note, Federal Acquisition of Non-Reserved
Water Rights After New Mexico, 31 STA. L. REv. 885 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Stanford
Note]; Note, Reserved Water Rights on National Forests After United States v. New Mex-
ico, 1979 UTAH L. REv. 609 [hereinafter cited as Utah Note]; Case Comment, 40 Omlo ST.
L.J. 729 (1979); Note, 54 WASH. L. Rv. 873 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Washington Note].
At least one commentator anticipated the decision. Note, New Mexico's National Forests
and the Implied Reservation Doctrine, 16 NAT. RESOURCES J. 975 (1976).
20 438 U.S. at 718 n.1 (Powell, J., dissenting in part).
2 Stanford Note, supra note 19; Utah Note, supra note 19; Case Comment, supra note
19; Washington Note, supra note 19.
'2 Solicitor's Opinion, supra note 7, at 574-78.
I Id. at 574.
Id. at 571, 577.
" Western States Water Council, Response to the Solicitor's Opinion on Federal
Water Rights, in 1979 ANNUAL REPORT 16-40 (1979) (on file with The University of Chicago
Law Review).
.. See also Simms, National Water Policy in the Wake of United States v. New Mex-
ico, 20 NAT. REsoURcEs J. 1 (1980); Comment, Federal Non-Reserved Water Rights, 15
LAND & WATER L. REv. 67 (1980).
'7 Letter to Scott Matheson, Governor of Utah, and Ed Herschler, Governor of Wyo-
ming, from Cecil Andrus, Secretary of the Interior (Feb. 4, 1980) (on file with The Univer-
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assert "no blanket, across the board claims for non-reserved
rights."2 For the time being, the nonreserved federal right argu-
ment is to be held in abeyance.2 9
This comment argues that the theory of a nonreserved right to
appropriate water for secondary federal land management objec-
tives is unsound and poses a serious threat to the rights of states
and private individuals.30 Absent authorization from Congress, fed-
eral agencies have no such nonreserved rights.31
sity of Chicago Law Review).
" Memorandum to Assistant Secretaries for Fish & Wildlife & Parks and for Land &
Water Resources and to Directors of Bureau of Land Management, Fish & Wildlife Service,
National Park Service, from Secretary of the Interior (Feb. 4, 1980) (on file with The Uni-
versity of Chicago Law Review). The Secretary's decision coincided with the resignation of
Leo Krulitz as Solicitor and the appointment of Clyde Martz as his successor. Mr. Martz
previously had questioned broad assertions of federal authority over water. See Discussion:
Water Resources, 6 LANm & WATER L. Rnv. 123, 128-29 (1970); Martz, The Role of the
Federal Government in State Water Law, 5 KAN. L. Rnv. 626, 627-32 (1957). Mr. Martz has
since returned to private practice.
2' The Department of Agriculture has adopted Interior's position on nonreserved
rights. Letter to Bob Bergland, Secretary of Agriculture, from Cecil Andrus, Secretary of the
Interior (Feb. 4, 1980); letter to Cecil Andrus from Bob Bergland (Apr. 7, 1980) (letters on
file with The University of Chicago Law Review).
Just before leaving office, Solicitor Martz supplemented the opinion of June 25, 1979.
Memorandum of the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior (Jan. 16, 1981) (on file with
The University of Chicago Law Review). The memorandum, superseding and modifying the
earlier opinion, states that the two situations in which the nonreserved right may exist are
(1) where federal agencies historically have used water for consumptive beneficial uses with-
out complying with state procedures, and (2) where an act of Congress clearly mandates a
use not conforming to substantive state law. Id. at 3.
The memorandum states that such claims will be limited in number and impact but
goes on to list seven principles supporting the right that track and reaffirm the theories of
the earlier opinion. Id. at 4-5. Most significantly, the memorandum asserts that neither the
Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1783 (1976 & Supp.
1I 1979), nor the Taylor Grazing Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 315-316 (1976), authorizes or mandates
federal water use "inconsistent in any way with the substantive requirements of state law."
Memorandum of the Solicitor, supra, at 5-6. To the extent that the memorandum remains
operative, it should substantially limit the scope of federal nonreserved claims.
' For example, in current litigation over the Big Horn River in Wyoming, the United
States is claiming nonreserved rights. These claims, if successful, would prevent any new
appropriations for private use. See Legal Parameters for United States' Statement of Claims
31-36, In re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water (Big Horn River), Civil No.
4993 (5th Dist., Wyo., filed Jan. 24, 1977); Wyoming's Brief in Support of Its Response to
the Claims for Water Rights of the United States and the Shoshone and Arapahoe Tribes at
152-59, Big Horn River, Civil No. 4993 (5th Dist., Wyo., filed Jan. 24, 1977).
31 The Ninth Circuit apparently has adopted this view already. Colville Confederated
Tribes v. Walton, 460 F. Supp. 1320, 1333 (E.D. Wash. 1978) ("where water is not explicitly
or impliedly reserved, it must be appropriated under state water laws even when needed by
the Federal sovereign for a federal reserve"), affld, No. 79-4297 (9th Cir. Aug. 30, 1980).
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II. THE ORIGINAL FEDERAL OWNERSHIP THEORY
When the Supreme Court first announced the existence of the
federal reserved water right in Winters v. United States,s2 the
Court did not reason from the existence of a federal riparian right
that vested under the common law. Instead, it based its decision
on the power of the United States to create rights binding on the
states under the treaty power.33 Nevertheless, many commentators
have thought that the reserved right is a riparian right held by the
federal government under the common law.3 4 The original source
for this position is a passage from Kent's Commentaries5 concern-
ing riparian rights that wis cited in dictum in United States v. Rio
Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 6 a case whose holding does not
support the position 7 Today, proponents of the federal nonre-
32 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
3 Id. at 574-77. The Court held that the United States had by its treaty with the Indi-
ans created water rights binding on the state. The Court explicitly disclaimed reliance on
the "doctrine of riparian rights urged by the Government," and did not consider whether a
federal riparian right exists. Id. at 578.
3' Hanks, Peace West of the 98th Meridian, 23 RuTras L. Rv. 33, 40 (1968); Kiechel
& Green, supra note 4, at 973; Morreale, Federal-State Conflict Over Western Waters-A
Decade of Attempted "Clarifying Legislation," 20 RUTGRs L. Rxv. 423 (1966); Munro, The
Pelton Decision: A New Riparianism?, 36 O. L. Rav. 221 (1957); Sondheim & Alexander,
Federal Indian Water Rights: A Retrogression to Quasi-Riparianism, 34 S. CAL. L. Rv. 1
(1960); Veeder, Winters Doctrine Rights-Keystone of National Programs for Western
Lands and Water Conservation and Utilization, 26 MoNT. L. Rzv. 149, 152 (1965); Warner,
Federal Reserved Rights and Appropriation States, 15 RocKy MTN. MIN. L. INST. 399, 400-
06 (1969); Note Federal-State Conflicts Over the Control of Western Waters, 60 COLuM. L.
Rzv. 967 (1960); Comment, The Federal Reserved Water Doctrine-Application to the
Problem of Water for Oil Shale Development, 3 LAND & WATEs L. Rzv. 75, 89 (1968). But
see Trelease, Uneasy Federalism-State Water Laws and National Water Uses, 55 WASH.
L. REv. 751, 764 & n.64 (1980).
35 3 J. KENT, ComNTA mS ON AMmuCAN LAW 353 (New York 1828):
Every proprietor of lands on the banks of a river has naturally an equal right to
the use of water which flows in the stream adjacent to his lands, as it was wont to run,
(currere solebat) without diminution or alteration. No proprietor above or below him
has a right to use the water to the prejudice of other proprietors unless he has a prior
right to divert it, or a title to some exclusive enjoyment. He has no property in the
water itself, but a simple usufruct while it passes along. Aqua currit et debet currere, is
the language of the law. Though he may use the water while it runs over his land, he
cannot unreasonably detain it, or give it another direction, and he must return it to its
ordinary channel when it leaves his estate.
36 174 U.S. 690, 702 (1899) (dictum).
37 In Rio Grande, the United States sought to enjoin the construction of a dam across
the Rio Grande River in the Territory of New Mexico. The Supreme Court reversed the
territorial court's dismissal of the complaint and remanded for a determination of whether
the impoundment of waters by the proposed dam would "substantially diminish the naviga-
bility of that stream within the present limits of navigability." Id. at 710. The Court cited
the Kent passage to show, as the starting point for its analysis, that the basis of water rights
1981]
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served right rely on the same Rio Grande dictum.3 8 That reliance
is misplaced.
A. The Rio Grande Dictum
The dictum assumes as a settled rule of the common law that
riparian ownership carries an attendant right to flowing waters.3 9
at common law was riparian land tenure. It then acknowledged that a state or a territory
could "change [the] common law rule and permit the appropriation of the flowing waters."
Id. at 703.
The Court posited two exceptions, however, to the states' freedom to adopt an appro-
priation system. States could not limit the federal government's preexisting riparian rights
or the navigability of navigable streams without specific authority from Congress. Id. It con-
cluded that Congress had, by the Act of July 26, 1866, ch. 262, 14 Stat. 251, the Act of July
9, 1870, ch. 235, § 17, 16 Stat. 218, and the Desert Land Act of 1877, ch. 107, § 1, 19 Stat.
377, see text and notes at notes 54, 108-112 infra, "assented to the appropriation of water in
contravention of the common law riparian rule," 174 U.S. at 706, but had not released its
control over navigable waters. Rio Grande is based on the navigation power, not on a federal
riparian right, and not on the passage from Kent. Its position on riparianism is just the
opposite of that for which proponents of federal riparianism cite the case.
In Winters, the Court relied on Rio Grande and United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371
(1905). "The power of the Government to reserve the waters and exempt them from appro-
priation under the state laws is not denied, and could not be." 207 U.S. at 577. The Court
upheld an order restraining private appropriation under state law for the benefit of an In-
dian reservation. The citation to Rio Grande is ambiguous, because the page cited, 174 U.S.
at 702, contains the Kent passage but not the discussion of federal power on which Winters
relies. See text and notes at notes 32-33 supra.
The Winters Court's reliance on Winans strengthens the argument that it, like the Rio
Grande Court, did not rely on the Kent passage but on the analysis introduced by that
quotation. In Winans, the United States obtained an injunction against the impairment of
Indian fishing rights by riparian non-Indian fishermen acting in accordance with state law.
198 U.S. at 377, 383-84. The Court held that the United States had exercised its power to
create fishing rights in the territories (which bound the states formed from those territo-
ries), not that it had a property right in the fish. Id. at 383.
3$E.g., Solicitor's Opinion, supra note 7, at 565, 571 & passim.
" See note 35 supra. "This is the clear and settled general doctrine." 3 J. KENT, supra
note 35, at 353-54. See also 1 R. CLARK, supra note 4, § 4.3.
In fact, the riparian doctrine was a relatively recent development in the common law. 1
S. WmL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATES §§ 66-70 (3d ed. 1911); Lauer, The Com-
mon Law Background of the Riparian Doctrine, 28 Mo. L. REv. 60 (1963); Note, Federal
Water Rights Legislation and the Reserved Lands Controversy, 53 GEo. L.J. 750, 753-57
(1965). Contra, Maas & Zoebel, Anglo-American Water Law: Who Appropriated the Ripa-
rian Doctrine?, 10 PuB. POLICY 109 (1960). In Blackstone's time, prior appropriation was the
rule, 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMmENTARIES *403, although there were few English cases on the
subject. Lack of development, rather than clear doctrine, characterized the law in this area.
Wiel, Waters: American Law and French Authority, 33 HARv. L. REv. 133, 133, 141-45
(1919). It was not until 1827 that riparian rights were authoritatively established in
America. Tyler v. Wilkerson, 24 F. Cas. 472 (C.C.D.R.I. 1827) (No. 14,312) (Story, J.). The
next year, Kent wrote the passage cited in Rio Grande. Both Kent and Story drew heavily
but tacitly on civilian sources. See United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725,
744-45 (1950); Wiel, supra, at 139. The riparian doctrine did not take firm hold in England
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Therefore, so the proponents' argument goes, the federal govern-
ment acquired riparian rights in territorial streams, rivers, and
ground waters and has retained this proprietary interest in all wa-
ters appropriated under state law.40 Because of the supremacy
clause, the states formed from those territories cannot extinguish
those rights.41
This argument postulates that the federal government ac-
quires rights under the common law, that is, state law,42 but denies
that state law can determine the existence and extent of those
rights. This amounts to saying that when the national government
acquires state-created water rights, they somehow become greater
than they were originally. The argument that the federal govern-
ment holds state-created rights, but that the states cannot define
these rights, is plainly inconsistent. It also contradicts the general
rule that a transferee obtains a right no greater than that pos-
sessed by the transferor. 3
Second, the proponents' argument depends on the assumption
that a state can create riparian rights in real property situated be-
yond its physical borders." This assumption is necessary because
until five years after Kent's writing. See Mason v. Hill, 3 B. & Ad. 304, 110 Eng. Rep. 114
(K.B. 1833); Wiel, supra, at 144. When the Court of Exchequer Chamber finally embraced
the doctrine in 1851, the court relied on Kent and Story. See Embrey v. Owen, 6 Ex. 353,
368-70, 155 Eng. Rep. 579, 585-86 (Exch. Ch. 1851) (quoting the Kent passage cited in Rio
Grande). In sum, there was no established rule at common law. See Wiel, Origin and Com-
parative Development of the Law of Water Courses in the Common Law and in the Civil
Law, 6 CALir. L. Rzv. 245 (1918).
'0 Solicitor's Opinion, supra note 7, at 575.
41 Id.; F. TELEAsE, FEnERAL-STATE RELATIONS IN WATER LAW 147 (National Water
Commission Legal Study No. 5, 1971).
42 See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
43 Congress intended the limited waiver of sovereign immunity in the McCarran
Amendment, 43 U.S.C. § 666(a) (1976), to eliminate such claims. "[T]he United States has
acquired many lands and water rights in States that have the doctrine of prior appropria-
tion. When these lands and water rights were acquired from the individuals the government
obtained no better rights than had the persons from whom the rights were obtained." S.
REP. No. 755, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 506 (1951); accord, FPC v. Oregon (Pelton Dam), 349
U.S. 435, 453 (1955) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
44 An alternative argument is that Congress imposed the common law on the territories,
which was then binding on the states, much as Congress created rights in the territories
binding on the states. See Clark v. Allaman, 71 Kan. 206, 80 P. 571 (1905). The Supreme
Court rejected this argument in Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 95-96 (1907), holding that
Congress did not have the power to apportion waters of the Arkansas River between the two
states. The precedential value of this case was doubtful after Arizona v. California, 373 U.S.
546 (1963), which held that Congress had so apportioned water of the Colorado River. Id. at
546-90. However, the Court in California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978), cited Kansas
v. Colorado with approval in limiting the scope of Arizona v. California and requiring the
Secretary of the Interior to follow state law. Id. at 655, 663. Although California v. United
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there was no decisional law in the West at the time of its acquisi-
tion by the United States; the only American common law was in
the decisions of the eastern states. Eastern courts, therefore, must
be responsible for the federal rights. This view, however, contra-
dicts traditional formulations of state jurisdiction; a state does not
have the power to create real property rights beyond its borders.
The federal government cannot have riparian rights in a given
state simply because it holds such rights in other states that ad-
here to riparian doctrine.46
States did not involve an interstate water source, see id. at 651, the Court distinguished
Arizona v. California as unique. Id. at 674-75. Whether the Court would follow California v.
United States or Arizona v. California in a case involving distribution of water from an
interstate reclamation project of a smaller scope than the Boulder Canyon Project is an
open question. Nonetheless, this much of Kansas v. Colorado remains unimpeached: Con-
gress did not impose the common law on the western states.
45 See, e.g., Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1 (1909); Clarke v. Clarke, 178 U.S. 186 (1900);
Pasos v. Pan Am. Airways, Inc., 229 F.2d 271 (2d Cir. 1955); Livingston v. Jefferson, 15 F.
Cas. 660 (C.C.D. Va. 1811) (No. 8,411) (Marshall, J.).
4' See Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 95 (1907): "Now the question arises between
two States, one recognizing generally the common law rule of riparian rights and the other
prescribing the doctrine of the public ownership of flowing water. Neither State can legislate
for or impose its own policy upon the other."
One qualification is appropriate here. There are two distinct theories of western water
rights, the "California" and "Colorado" doctrines. The former holds sway in California,
Kansas, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, and Washing-
ton; the latter rules in Colorado, Arizona, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and
Wyoming. 5 R. CLARK, supra note 4, § 400, at 7 & nn.21-22. Under the California doctrine,
the federal government has an original property right in all the nonnavigable waters of the
states formed from territories acquired by the United States. Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255,
336-43, 10 P. 674, 720-24 (1886); 1 S. WmL, supra note 39, §§ 152-153. States that have
adopted the California doctrine recognize appropriative and riparian rights, both of which
derive from the original federal title. Id. §§ 155-156. Thus, to the extent that the courts of
these states apply the doctrine, there is a common law foundation for the federal riparian
rights.
In Colorado-doctrine states, on the other hand, the United States never acquired title
to western waters. 2 C. KnEY, LAw OF IRRIGATION § 632 (2d ed. 1912); 5 R. CLARK, supra
note 4, § 405, at 41 n.3; 1 S. WmL, supra note 39, § 167.
The Colorado doctrine apparently has gained the approval of the Supreme Court, Bo-
quillas Land & Cattle Co. v. Curtis, 213 U.S. 339, 345 (1909) (Arizona law), and a federal
district court in California rejected the argument that under the California doctrine the
federal agencies may take unappropriated water as property of the United States. United
States v. Falibrook Pub. Util. Dist., 165 F. Supp. 806 (S.D. Cal. 1958). But see Nevada ex
rel. Shamberger v. United States, 165 F. Supp. 600 (D. Nev. 1958), aff'd on other grounds,
279 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1960). One may argue that the California doctrine is not good law.
See 1 S. WmL, supra note 39, § 122. But see 2 C. KINmsy, supra, §§ 636-640. Indeed, its
rationale is simply incorrect. When California adopted the common law, Lux v. Haggin, 69
Cal. 255, 337, 10 P. 674, 720, (1886), it did not include water rights that attached to all
riparian lands within the state. Riparianism was only one alternative a court could employ.
Appropriation, if anything, was the common law rule. See note 39 supra. Adoption of the
common law only means that the state or territory adopts "a general system as against
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Finally, riparian rights are not as broad as the federal reserved
right, and the reserved right has never been limited according to
riparian definitions.47 Unless the lesser (riparian rights) can in-
clude the greater (federal reserved rights), common law riparian-
ism is an inadequate basis for the federal reserved right, much less
the nonreserved right.
The Rio Grande passage would be correct if it were limited to
a situation where a state, having previously recognized riparian
rights, attempted to deny them upon switching to an appropriation
system.48 The federal government could then raise the supremacy
clause, which prohibits state destruction of federal property
rights.49 However, this is very different from the argument of the
Rio Grande dictum that a state may not, from the beginning, insti-
tute an appropriation system that would "destroy" federal riparian
rights within the state.
These logical problems involved in a claim of a federal ripa-
rian right may not, in themselves, constitute sufficient reason to
reject the claim, but they do identify inconsistencies within the
theory. These inconsistencies are the result of a problem in the
internal structure of the theory.
B. The Federal Right and the Common Law
Analysis of the assertion of a federal riparian right in western
waters under the common law reveals a fundamental flaw. The
another general system," not that "patentees of a ranch on the San Pedro are to have the
same rights as owners of an estate on the Thames." Boquillas Land & Cattle Co. v. Curtis,
213 U.S. 339, 345 (1909). See also text and notes at notes 50-54 infra.
47 See, e.g., Comment, Implied Reservation Claims After Cappaert v. United States,
1977 ARiz. ST. L.J. 647, 660-62.
48 South Dakota, for example, had until 1955 a mixed system of appropriative, riparian,
and absolute water rights. In that year, the state adopted a purely appropriative system.
South Dakota Water Act of 1955, ch. 430, 1955 S.D. Sess. Laws 506 (codified at S.D. Com'.
LAws ANN. §§ 46-1, -5 (1967)). If the state had not provided for recognition of preexisting
rights, the statute would have been open to constitutional attack. Note, Water Rights and
the Constitutionality of the 1955 South Dakota Water Act, 11 S.D.L. Rav. 374 (1966). Rec-
ognizing this problem, and not wishing to disturb vested rights, the state protected them
with "grandfather" provisions. S.D. Comp. LAws ANN. §§ 46-1-9 to -10 (1967).
" See Public Util. Dist. No. I v. Inland Power & Light Co., 64 Wash. 2d 122, 390 P.2d
690 (1964) (federal land immune from state eminent domain power); cf. Utah Power &
Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389 (1917) (lands of United States not subject to dispo-
sition under state laws). Compare United States v. 161 Acres of Land, 427 F. Supp. 528 (D.
Colo. 1977) ("Colorado can create no right to condemn publicly owned lands") with Rauser
v. Toston Irrig. Dist., 172 Mont. 530, 535, 565 P.2d 632, 636- (1977) (ownership by United
States "does not limit the power to condemn"). See generally 1 P. RoHAN & J. SACKMAN,
NicHOLS' THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 2.22 (3d ed. 1979).
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problem arises because the term "common law" has undergone a
transformation in meaning since Rio Grande.
That case was decided during the era of the general federal
common law. 0 Until the early twentieth century, the federal judi-
ciary presupposed the existence of a common law independent of
the courts that applied it. Courts found their rules of decision;
they did not create them.51
Erie Railroad v. Tompkins52 set this jurisprudence aside.5 3
Consequently, the presumed body of law that supports the re-
served right is no longer available to ground some new federal
claim. There is no common law under which it can be said that the
United States took title to all the unappropriated western waters.M
50 See Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842):
In the ordinary use of language it will hardly be contended that the decisions of Courts
constitute laws. They are, at most, only evidence of what the laws are, and are not of
themselves laws. . . . [T]he true interpretation and effect [of commercial paper] . . .
are to be sought, not in the decisions of the local tribunals, but in the general principles
and doctrines of commercial jurisprudence. . . . The law respecting negotiable instru-
ments may be truly declared ... to be in a great measure, not the law of a single
country only, but of the entire world....
... Non erit alia lex Romae, alia Athenis, alia nunc, alia posthac, sed et apud
omnes gentes, et omni tempore, una eademque lex obtinebit [There will not be one
law at Rome, another at Athens, one law now, another later, but both among all people
and at all times one and the same law will obtain].
Id. at 18-19 (quoting Luke v. Lyde, 2 Burr. 882, 887, 97 Eng. Rep. 614, 617 (K.B. 1759)
(paraphrasing CicEno, D. RFPUBLIcA 3.33)).
51 As dissatisfaction with this view of the common law grew, judges occasionally mocked
the notion of an immutable common law. "The Common law is not a brooding omnipresence
in the sky but the articulate voice of some sovereign or quasi-sovereign that can be identi-
fied .... It is always the law of some State. .. " Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S.
205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
52 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
53 Id. at 78: "Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of
Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State .... There is no federal
general common law."
" The common law was received in western territories and states by acts of Congress
and state constitutions or statutes. See, e.g., Act of May 2, 1890, ch. 182, 26 Stat. 94; COLO.
REv. STAT. ch. 16, § 1 (1867). See also Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 62 (1890). The reception was limited, however.
Where they were found to be inappropriate for local conditions of a state or territory, com-
mon law rules were rejected. See, e.g., ARiz. CONST. art. 17, § 1 (1910) (common law riparian
doctrine of no force or effect).
The original source of western water law was the custom and practice of the pioneers.
The appropriation doctrine grew out of the mining camps and districts. See Irwin v. Phil-
lips, 5 Cal. 140, 146-47 (1855); Eddy v. Simpson, 3 Cal. 249, 252 (1853). See also 0. HOLLIS-
TERa, THE MNES OF COLORADo 359-74 (1867); 1 C. LINDLEY, AimmucAm LAw RELATING "TO
MINEs AND MneRAL LANDs § 42 (2d ed. 1903); C. SHNN, MINING CAMPs: A STUDY IN AM .M-
CAN FRONTIER GOVERNMENT 150-89 (1885). It was in recognition and adoption of these water
law rules that Congress passed the three acts releasing its control of western waters, as
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State common law does not support a federal riparian title; indeed,
it is in cases where state law does not give the federal agencies as
much as they want that they make the riparian argument.5 5 The
riparian claim is not based on state law but is made in spite of it.
The only remaining source of law that might support the non-
reserved right is the modern federal common law."' Principles of
this "special" federal common law, examined below,57 dictate that
no federal nonreserved right can exist until Congress acts.
C. The Reserved Right
Even if a residual 8 federal water right exists, "9 it is nothing
more than the reserved right.6 0 The reserved right exhausts the
federal riparian right because it is the sole exception to the long-
standing deference that Congress has paid to state control of west-
ern waters.
6 1
The Supreme Court has said that this right is to be narrowly
construed to give effect to the congressional policy.6 2 The reserved
recognized in Rio Grande. See note 37 supra; text and notes at notes 108-112 infra. But see
note 46 supra; cf. United States v. Morrison, 203 F. 364 (C.C.D. Colo. 1901) (acts inappli-
cable to United States).
The common law system, see Boquillas Land & Cattle Co. v. Curtis, 213 U.S. 339
(1909), embraced pioneer water law as the common law rule. Union Mill & Mining Co. v.
Danberg, 81 F. 73, 93 (C.C.D. Nev. 1897). The Supreme Court joined western courts and
Congress in recognizing the validity of rights predicated on the rule. Broder v. Natoma
Water & Mining Co. 101 U.S. 274 (1879); Jennison v. Kirk, 98 U.S. 453 (1878); ef. Sturr v.
Beck, 133 U.S. 541 (1890) (riparian rights attach to public lands only on conveyance to
private owner and according to state law).
55 Where water is available for federal projects under state law, federal agencies are
happy to proceed under it unless a reserved right is available. Solicitor's Opinion, supra
note 7, at 578; letter to Cecil Andrus, supra note 29.
be "The rights and duties of the United States... are governed by federal rather than
by local law.... In absence of an applicable Act of Congress it is for the federal courts to
fashion the governing rule of law according to their own standards." Clearfield Trust Co. v.
United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366-67 (1943). See also Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And of the
New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 383 (1964).
57 See text and notes at notes 82-99 infra.
58 The "residual" right is that which remains of the original federal title under the
California doctrine, see note 46 supra, and which purportedly underlies both the reserved
and nonreserved federal rights, see Solicitor's Opinion, supra note 7, at 563.
so Some commentators believe that it does. See, e.g., Hanks, supra note 34, at 40;
Kiechel & Green, supra note 4, at 973.
'8 California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 662 (1978). The Court's treatment of the
Rio Grande dictum clearly identifies reserved rights with the riparian rights spoken of by
Chancellor Kent.
*, Id.; United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 701-02, 715 (1978).
2 United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978). Furthermore, the reserved right
applies only to the minimum amount of water necessary to accomplish primary purposes.
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right is identical with the federal riparian right.63 The nonreserved
federal right theory is an attempt to reopen the question of the
scope of the reserved right under a new rubric." Recognition of the
nonreserved right would frustrate the congressional policy to limit
the federal exception to state control. By identifying the Rio
Grande riparian right with the reserved right in California v.
United States, the Court rejected the implication of a riparian
nonreserved right.
In sum, the argument that Rio Grande supports a nonreserved
right expands the reserved right beyond the limit set for it by the
Supreme Court. It relies on an assertion of federal title premised
on a discredited nineteenth-century notion of common law. If a
federal right does exist in nonreserved and unappropriated waters,
it is not the result of the United States's having "title" to the wa-
ters. One must look elsewhere, namely, to the power of Congress to
create property rights for the United States.
III. CONGRESSIONAL POWER AND FEDERAL APPROPRIATION OF
WATER
A. The Concept of Ownership
Although the federal government has no proprietary right in
nonreserved and unappropriated western waters, Congress can cre-
ate such a right.6 5 The power to do so is ancient, simple, and basic.
For over two thousand years the Western legal world has in-
cluded water in the "negative community" of property common to
all but owned by none until reduced to possession. 6 When the
thing is not possessed, it is not owned.6 7 The classic example of a
member of the negative community is the wild animal."8 The fun-
Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 141 (1976).
13 See note 60 supra.
" Simms, supra note 26, at 9.
" F. TRELEA E, supra note 41, at 147.
The concept of the negative community is rooted in the Institutes of Justinian and
in the civil law. See, e.g., United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 744-45
(1950). See generally Wiel, Running Water, 22 Hav. L. REv. 190, 204 (1909); Wiel, Theo-
ries of Water Law, 27 HAv. L. REv. 530, 530-31 (1914); see also Pound, The End of Law as
Developed in Legal Rules and Doctrine, 27 HRv. L. REv. 195, 233-34 (1914).
67 "[W]ater is a moveable wandering thing, and must of necessity continue common by
the law of nature; so that I can have only a temporary, transient, usufructuary, property
therein .... ." 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COsMMNTAMES *18.
See Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 522-26 (1896), overruled on other grounds,
Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979). See generally Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1805); 2 W. BLACKSTONE, ComENTrARms *403; 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 217-
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damental characteristic of ownership of wild animals is that it is
established by capture.6 9 All persons have the power to establish
ownership in this way; Congress can exercise this power and create
a federal property right in such animals by authorizing its agents
to capture them. Similarly, Congress can create a federal property
right in water by authorizing federal agencies to appropriate and
use it.7° It is also ancient doctrine,-however, that the sovereign may
establish rules to regulate, and even prohibit, the exploitation of
natural resources. This regulatory jurisdiction is different from the
sovereign's proprietary rights.7 1 This doctrine of res publicae con-
siders natural resources to be government-owned only in the sense
that the sovereign may regulate their use to protect the public
interest. 2
A recent Supreme Court decision concerning state-federal con-
flicts over wild animals supports this view of government owner-
ship. In Hughes v. Oklahoma," an Oklahoma statute4 prohibiting
the exportation of minnows was challenged under the commerce
clause. The Oklahoma court asserted that "the wild animals and
fish within a state's border are, so far as capable of ownership,
owned by the state in its sovereign capacity for the common bene-
fit of all its people," and held the statute to be a constitutional
regulation of state property.7 5 The Supreme Court rejected the
18 (1881); 2 J. KENT, supra note 35, at 281-83.
" See Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 539-40 (1896); Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175,
177 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805).
70 F. TREuLASE, supra note 41, at 147.
71 Bannister, The Question of Federal Disposition of State Waters in the Priority
States, 28 HI-Rv. L. Rav. 270, 286-291 (1915). This distinction is often overlooked. E.g.,
TASK FORCE 5A-PRESIDENT'S WATER POLICY IILEMENTATION, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE
ON NON-INDIAN FEDERAL WATER RIGHTS 64 n.69 (June 1980) (equating ownership and inpe-
rium) (on file with The University of Chicago Law Review).
'2 Pound, supra note 66, at 234. This is one of the concepts that merges into the doc-
trine of res communes. Compare Trelease, Government Ownership and Trusteeship of
Water, 45 CALIF. L. Rav. 638, 643 & n.26 (1957) (arguing that this category is not consist-
ently defined) with Lasky, From Prior Appropriation to Economic Distribution of Water by
the State-Via Irrigation Administration, 1 ROCKY MT. L. Rsv. 161, 186-87 (1929) (argu-
ing that the inconsistencies result more from occasional scholastic "corruption" than from
significant doctrinal inconsistencies) and Well, Running Water, supra note 66, at 192
(same). Thus, assertions of sovereign ownership are complex declarations of the legitimate
governmental interest (res publicae) in regulating the exploitation of natural resources (res
communes). Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 335-36 (1979). Because neither the federal
nor state government owns the water in a proprietary sense, governmental assertions of
"ownership" actually amount to claims of regulatory jurisdiction.
73 441 U.S. 322 (1979) (overruling Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896)).
7, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, § 4-115(B) (West 1976).
75 Hughes v. State, 572 P.2d 573, 575 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977).
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Oklahoma court's view of state ownership. It recognized the need
to "preserv[e] the legitimate state concerns for conservation and
protection of wild animals underlying the 19th century [res publi-
cae] legal fiction of state ownership,"7 but nonetheless held the
statute invalid because the state's asserted ownership of the min-
nows was only a regulatory interest being exercised to obstruct in-
terstate commerce. 7 Oklahoma's claim to ownership of minnows
parallels the conflicting claims made by western states and the
United States to ownership of western waters. The state and fed-
eral governments share an interest in proper regulation of water.
Neither "owns" unappropriated water,78 but each has the power to
use it and to regulate its use.
In light of this view of government ownership, it is not impor-
tant whether the federal government "owns" water in western
states. The federal government can obtain traditional ownership of
water by appropriating it. The important question is whether state
or federal rules of capture apply to the United States. In other
words, the issue is whether Congress has established a federal reg-
ulatory jurisdiction over federal appropriations, or has recognized
the inherent regulatory jurisdiction of the states and adapted fed-
eral programs to it.
B. Federal Common Law and State Regulation of Federal
Appropriation
Congress has not enacted a general statute regulating federal
acquisition of appropriative water rights,79 although the idea has
been suggested several times.8 0 Instead, Congress has recognized
and deferred to state control of western waters.81
76 441 U.S. at 335-36.
7 Id. at 335.
78 "A State does not stand in the same position as the owner of a private game preserve
and it is pure fantasy to talk of 'owning' wild fish, birds or animals. Neither the States
nor the Federal Government, any more than a hopeful fisherman or hunter, has title to
these creatures until they are reduced to possession by skillful capture."
Id. at 334 (quoting Douglas v. Seacoast Prods. Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 284 (1977)); accord,
Trelease, supra note 34, at 763 & n. 61.
7' Solicitor's Opinion, supra note 7, at 570.
8* F. TRLEASE, supra note 41, at 252-65; UNITED STATES PUBLIC LAND LAW Rviaw
COMMSSION, ONF THiRD OF THE NATiON's LAND 141-55 (1970); Morreale, supra note 34, at
510-12.
81 In United States v. New Mexico, the court noted that "[w]here Congress has ex-
pressly addressed the question of whether federal entities must abide by state water law, it
has almost invariably deferred to the state law." 438 U.S. at 702 (footnote omitted). The
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Nevertheless, the question remains whether the water systems
of the western states are to be displaced by a federal appropriative
rule whenever a federal agency believes that the state system limits
its ability to accomplish secondary management objectives man-
dated by Congress. Because Congress has not explicitly decided
whether federal agencies must obey the laws of the states in appro-
priating water for secondary management purposes, but federal
rights are involved, the issue is one of the modern federal common
law.82 The power to formulate a federal rule of decision may flow
Court supported this proposition with a citation to a Senate document listing 37 statutes "in
which Congress has expressly recognized the importance of deferring to state water law." Id.
at 702 n.5 (citing Federal Water Rights: Hearings on S. 1275 Before the Subcomm. on Irri-
gation & Reclamation of the Senate Comm. on Interior & Insular Affairs, 85th Cong. 2d
Sess. 302-10 (1964) (supplementary material submitted by Senator Kuchel) [hereinafter
cited as 1964 Hearings]).
One law review note argues that these 37 statutes do not demonstrate a long-standing
congressional deference to state water law. "[A]II such a list shows is that Congress deferred
to state law on 37 occasions.... [O]ne can draw a comparable list of occasions on which
Congress chose not to defer to state law .... "Stanford Note, supra note 19, at 909 (foot-
note omitted). The note presents such a list, but the statutes cited do not support this view.
They focus upon state-created water rights and their acquisition by the federal government.
Most of the statutes the note cites provide authorization or funding for the acquisition
of state rights for federal purposes. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. §§ 4601-9(a)(1), -10a, -10b (1976) (for
recreational inholdings); id. §§ 460bb-2(a), 541(e) (for Suislaw National Forest by donation,
purchase, exchange, or otherwise); id. §§ 541(d), 690 (for Bear River Migrating Bird Refuge
by purchase, lease, or gift). The repeated enumerations of specific methods of acquisition
make no sense unless predicated on state rights: if the rights were federal, the federal gov-
ernment would already own them.
Of the entire list cited in the note, only one statute plausibly mandates federal adminis-
tration of western water, id. § la-2(e). None explicitly authorizes a federal agency to pre-
empt state water administration; none faces the issue. Most contemplate federal acquisition
of state law rights. See also Solicitor's Opinion, supra note 7, at 578. In sum, the statutes do
not support the claim that Congress has, on at least 25 occasions, chosen not to defer to
state law.
The note also scrutinized the 37 statutes to which the Court adverted in United States
v. New Mexico. 31 STA. L. Rv. at 909-10 & nn.121-124. It first bases an attack on the
Court's use of the 37 statutes on a quibble between recognition and deference, arguing that
Senator Kuchel submitted the list only to show congressional recognition of, but not defer-
ence to, state water law. Id. at 909 & n.121. Apparently this argument relies on the heading
of the supplement, which is "Past Recognition of State Law." 1964 Hearings, supra, at 302.
An examination of the statutes listed reveals that the recognition always was for the pur-
pose of deference, as noted by the Court, 438 U.S. at 702.
'1 Federal courts have the power to determine federal water rights not established by
Congress. See United States v. District Court for Eagle County, 401 U.S. 520, 526 (1971). On
the same day that it announced the end of the "federal general common law," Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938), the Supreme Court sustained its jurisdiction over an in-
terstate stream apportionment dispute arising from a state's highest court on the basis of
the "federal common law." Hinderlider v. LaPlata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S.
92, 110 (1938). See Friendly, supra note 56, at 408. See also Grow & Stewart, The Winters
Doctrine as Federal Common Law, 10 NAT. REsoURcEs L. 457 (1977) (reserved rights doc-
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from the Court's constitutional jurisdiction over disputes between
the states,83 from congressional grants of exclusive jurisdiction,84 or
from the fact that the rights and duties of the United States are in
question. 5
The federal common law may incorporate state law.86 Federal
common law rules are invoked only when a substantial federal in-
terest is at stake." It is not enough that Congress could regulate
federal water appropriations; there must be a significant conflict
between state law and federal policy.8 Furthermore, it is not
enough that a federal interest would be defeated by state law in
isolated cases; the federal interest must require uniformity. On
the other hand, where state law would frustrate congressional pol-
icy, a special federal rule is necessary.oo
In United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc.,91 the Court incorpo-
rated state law to decide whether contractual liens arising from
federal loan programs take precedence over private security inter-
ests. It held that courts should consider several factors concerning
the effects of applying state law to specific federal interests. If the
federal program must be uniform, so must the rule; if uniformity is
not required, the federal rule of decision may incorporate state
law. Where a general federal rule would disrupt private relations
predicated on state law, incorporation of the state rules is
desirable.
trine is federal common law).
88 Hinderlider v. LaPlata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110-11 (1938).
84 Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
88 United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979); Clearfield Trust Co. v.
United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
8 United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979); United States v. Yazell,
382 U.S. 341, 356 (1966).
8'7 Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29 (1956); Reconstruction
Fin. Auth. v. Beaver County, 328 U.S. 204 (1946).
U See United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 727-28 (1979).
8 Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 U.S. 653 (1979); United States v. Kimbell Foods,
Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728 (1979); UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 701-03 (1966);
cf. Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (state law controls private dispute
over federal oil and gas lease).
80 United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728 & n.23 (1979). This is distinct
from the rule forbidding the states from discriminating against the federal government. For
example, the Solicitor attempts to rely on United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412
U.S. 580 (1973), in arguing for the inapplicability of state law to federal appropriation. So-
licitor's Opinion, supra note 7, at 574-77. In that case, however, the state law was specifi-
cally hostile to federal interests, 412 U.S. at 595, and the federal program did not require
uniformity, see id. at 607 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
91 440 U.S. 715 (1979).
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The Solicitor argues that uniform management of federal
lands is an important federal policy that justifies a general federal
rule establishing the nonreserved right.92 The recent case of Wil-
son v. Omaha Indian Tribe,9 a boundary dispute between Indians
and non-Indians, undercuts his argument. The Court approved, as
the federal rule of decision, the application of state law rules of
accretion and avulsion 9' to determine the location of the Indian
reservation's border.9 5 Because this decision had the effect of
shrinking the reservation, the Indians objected to the application
of state law, arguing that federal boundary cases should provide
the rule of decision.
The Court found no need for a uniform federal rule because
"'generalized pleas for uniformity as substitutes for concrete evi-
dence that adopting state law would adversely affect [federal inter-
ests]'" are insufficient reasons for rejecting state law. e The Court
noted that no unfairness to the United States would result: the
jurisdiction of federal courts is sufficient to ensure equity and
evenhandedness in application of state law to federal rights. 7 The
Court also recognized the strong state interest in having its law
apply to protect "the reasonable expectations of. .. private land
owners upset by the vagaries of being located adjacent to . . .
property in which the United States has a substantial interest." ' s
Finding that a federal rule threatened to harm existing private re-
lationships based on state law, and that no frustration of federal
policy or functions required a nationally uniform rule, the Court
decided that state law should be incorporated.99
In light of this decision, the Solicitor's assertion of a federal
appropriative right for congressionally authorized purposes 00 lacks
merit. He merely makes a general plea for uniformity of federal
land management programs;101 he does not attempt to present evi-
:2 Solicitor's Opinion, supra note 7, at 576-77.
'3 442 U.S. 653 (1979).
" Avulsion is the abrupt change in a river course in which property boundaries marked
by the river do not change. Accretion is the gradual change in a river course, in which case
the property line moves with the river. See id. at 660 n.7.
:5 Id. at 661.
6 Id. at 673 (quoting United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 730 (1979)).
97 442 U.S. at 673-74.
53 Id. at 674.
1 Id. at 673.
100 Solicitor's Opinion, supra note 7, at 574-78.
101 If the Court intended [in United States v. New Mexico] that the United States
could only assert water rights for purposes recognized as beneficial under state law,
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dence that federal policy or interests would be frustrated by full
compliance with state law. Such an attempt would be difficult. The
federal common law takes as its starting point federal statutes,"e'
and seeks to glean from them the policies of the Congress. When
federal programs are adapted to state law, there is no need for uni-
formity.108 A close reading of three major federal statutes demon-
strates that congressional policy consistently has been to adapt
federal land management programs to state law, rather than to cre-
ate uniform federal rules.
In 1976, Congress enacted the Federal Land Policy and Man-
agement Act ("FLPMA"), 04 which reformed the law governing the
Bureau of Land Management.10 5 The FLPMA repealed a series of
prior statutes regarding homesteading, disposal, withdrawal, ad-
ministration, and rights-of-way with respect to public lands.106
However, Congress expressly disavowed an intent to create any
new, or modify any old, water rights or water law.1 07 The Senate
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources explicitly identified
the Desert Land Act of 1877108 as a law not repealed by the
FLPMA.10 9 By the Desert Land Act, in conjunction with the Act of
July 26, 1866110 and the Act of July 9, 1870,111 "all non-navigable
then the federal land manager would have to manage the same kind of federal lands
significantly differently in different states, depending on local law. The BLM, for ex-
ample, may not be able to manage lands for recreation and fishery protection in one
state to the same extent that it could in a neighboring state because of differences in
what are regarded as "beneficial uses" under each state's law.
Solicitor's Opinion, supra note 7, at 576.
102 Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 69 (1966).
103 United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 357 (1966).
104 Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 243 (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1783 (1976)) [herein-
after cited without cross-reference as FLPMA].
105 See Landstrom, An Operational View of the BLM Organic Act, 54 DEN. L.J. 445
(1977); Lasner, Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976: Fruition or Frustration,
54 DEN. L.J. 387 (1977).
1 FLPMA §§ 702-706, 90 Stat. 2787-93.
10 Id. § 701(g), 90 Stat. 2786; see Memorandum of the Solicitor, supra note 29.
108 43 U.S.C. § 321 (1976) (desert land patentees must acquire water rights under law of
prior appropriation and subject to existing rights).
109 S. REP. No. 583, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 77 (1975), reprinted in SENATE COMM. ON
ENERGY AND NATURAL REsOURcES, LEGISLATIWE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL LAND POLICY AND
MANAGEMENT AcT OF 1976, at 142 (1978).
110 43 U.S.C. § 661 para. 1 (1976) (United States recognizes appropriative rights estab-
lished on public land under local law).
"I Id. § 661 para. 2 (all federal land patents, preemptions, and homesteads subject to
vested appropriative rights).
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waters then a part of the public domain became. subject to the
plenary control of the designated states." 112
In 1960, Congress passed the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield
Act ("MUSYA"), 11 s the centerpiece of modern National Forest
management. 11 4 It was under the secondary purposes11 5 of MUSYA
that the United States made the reserved rights claims rejected in
112 California Or. Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 163-64
(1935). This case might be limited to its facts-private disputes to which the United States
is not a party, see id. at 150-51-but a broader policy is expressed in the Desert Land Act.
The Desert Land Act does not bind or purport to bind the states to any policy. It
simply recognizes and gives sanction, insofar as the United States and its future
grantees are concerned, to the state and local doctrine of prior appropriation, and
seeks to remove what otherwise might be an impediment to its full and successful
operation.
Id. at 164 (emphasis added).
Although this is dictum insofar as it refers to the United States, which was not a party,
Beaver Portland is in principle applicable to the United States. The fact that the Beaver
Portland Court relied in part on Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 94 (1907), see 295 U.S. at
164, does not lessen its precedential value despite Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
See note 44 supra.
The scope of Beaver Portland was limited to public, i.e., nonreserved, lands in FPC v.
Oregon (Pelton Dam), 349 U.S. 435 (1955) (Acts of 1866 and 1870 and Desert Land Act
inapplicable to reserved lands; therefore, United States need not acquire license under state
law to construct hydroelectric dam on federal reservation).
However, California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978), may have overruled Pelton
Dam on this point. Pelton Dam was decided under the Federal Water Power Act, ch. 285, 41
Stat. 1063 (1920), as amended by Federal Power Act, ch. 687, § 201, 49 Stat. 838 (1935)
(current version at 16 U.S.C. §§ 791a-828c (1976)). California v. United States held that the
United States must comply with state water law in a federal reclamation project situated on
a nonnavigable intrastate river (such as the one in Pelton Dam). 438 U.S. at 651. The
United States had attempted to invoke the Federal Water Power Act and Pelton Dam. Brief
for the United States at 23, 24, 25, 52, 54, 90, 128, 129, California v. United States, 438 U.S.
645 (1978). To the extent that the Court rejected this argument and adverted to the Desert
Land Act as indicative of the long-standing congressional adoption of state law for federal
reclamation projects, id. at 657, it revived the broad scope of Beaver Portland. Indeed, Cali-
fornia v. United States quotes the same passage with approval, id. at 657-58, and appar-
ently adopts the view of Justice Douglas's Pelton Dam dissent. See FPC v. Oregon (Pelton
Dam), 349 U.S. 435, 453, 457 (1955) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Thus, Pelton Dam now stands
only for the proposition that the federal government need not comply with state water law
where no federal appropriation occurs. However, even if federal appropriation is not subject
to state law on federal reserved lands, the congressional policy of deference to state law still
prevails on all federal public lands.
11 Pub. L. No. 86-517, 74 Stat. 215 (1960) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-31 (1976)).
14 MUSYA supplements the Forest Service Organic Act, ch. 2, 30 Stat. 34 (1897) (cur-
rent version at 16 U.S.C. §§ 473-478, 479-482, 551 (1976)). See id. § 528. MUSYA "gave the
Forest Service the widest and most comprehensive charter ... that any Federal agency
possesses." S. REP. No. 686, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 4060, 4068.
'5 These are outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed, and wildlife and fish pur-
poses. 16 U.S.C. § 528 (1976).
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United States v. New Mexico:1" Just as MUSYA did not support
the reserved right, it does not support a nonreserved right, because
there are no federal interests sufficient to justify a uniform federal
rule.
For example, uniformity is not essential to the National Forest
management program. It could, in fact, be damaging to the pro-
gram. "One of the basic concepts of multiple use is that all of these
resources are entitled to equal consideration, but in particularized
or localized areas, relative values of the various resources are to be
recognized." 117 The Secretary of Agriculture must give "due con-
sideration to the relative values of various resources in particular
areas."1 8 He also must "provide for public participation in the de-
velopment, review, and revision of land management plans.""'1 His
approach to land management must be "systematic" and "interdis-
ciplinary,' ' 20 but nowhere is he charged with the duty of achieving
uniformity of forest management. This is not surprising; the policy
behind the multiple uses that the Secretary must achieve1 21 de-
mands that periodic adjtistments in use be made "to conform to
changing needs and conditions" 22 and that "some land will be
used for less than all of the resources.' 23 Uniformity simply is not
important to the program.'
Thus, neither public lands administered by the Bureau of
Land Management nor National Forest System lands require uni-
form management. Because Congress either has adapted its pro-
grams to state law or has designed them to allow for variations in
management according to local conditions, lack of uniformity will
not frustrate any specific federal objectives.
116 438 U.S. at 713-15.
117 H.R. REP. No. 1551, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in [1960] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 2377, 2379; see 16 U.S.C. §§ 1604(e), 1604(g), 1607 (1976).
I' 16 U.S.C. § 529 (1976).
119 Id. § 1604(d).
12 Id. § 1604(b).
1 Id. § 529.
122 Id. § 531.
. Id.
1 Cf. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976), on which the Solicitor attempts to
rely. Solicitor's Opinion, supra note 7, at 563, 575-76. There the state defied a specific con-
gressional land management mandate and challenged Congress's power to regulate the pub-
lic domain. 426 U.S. at 533, 536-37. See also Ventura County v. Gulf Oil Corp., 601 F.2d
1080 (9th Cir. 1979), aff'd mem., 445 U.S. 947 (1980). In both Kleppe, see 426 U.S. at 543,
and Ventura, see 601 F.2d at 1083, 1086, Congress had enacted statutes that-unlike those
regarding water regulation on the public domain-were not adapted to state law. The cases
are inapposite and do not support the Solicitor's view because Congress has adapted federal
land management programs to state water laws.
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Furthermore, the nonreserved right threatens to disrupt pri-
vate relationships based on state law. The Solicitor suggests that
the right need not be "perfected under state procedures. 1 2 5 To the
extent that federal agencies appropriate water without complying
with state procedures, they remove themselves from state jurisdic-
tion. This defeats the purpose of the McCarran Amendment,1 2 6
which subjects the United States to general state water adjudica-
tions. "The clear federal policy evinced by that legislation is the
avoidance of piecemeal adjudication of water rights in a water sys-
tem.' 2  The reasons for this policy are the interdependence of
water rights and the congressional selection of state water systems
for the unification of relationships among users.'28 The fact that
state procedures may burden the United States is not an indica-
tion of frustration of a federal purpose. 29 The United States is
subject to them under the McCarran Amendment no matter what
water right it asserts. 30 Finally, the states have a strong interest in
regulating the development of water resources, as has long been
recognized by the United States.'31
CONCLUSION
This comment has argued that the recent assertions of a fed-
eral nonreserved water right are untenable. They are based on two
nineteenth-century conceptions that the Supreme Court has re-
jected or reformulated.
The first is the general federal common law. The nonreserved
right argument relies on it in finding a riparian federal right in
unappropriated western waters under the common law. No appro-
priation state's common law provides such support and no other
state's courts can create such rights beyond its borders.
The second is that the sovereign interest in natural resources
is a property right akin to title. This interest is, in fact, the govern-
ment's interest in regulating the exploitation of those resources.
115 Solicitor's Opinion, supra note 7, at 577. The Solicitor reasons that compliance with
state procedure has certain advantages and is the "better policy" but that he is "unable to
say that such compliance is required as a matter of law." Id.
126 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1976).
' Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 819 (1976).
22 Id.
"I See United States v. District Court for Water Div. No. 5, 401 U.S. 527, 529 (1971).
130 United States v. District Court for Eagle County, 401 U.S. 520 (1971).
"I California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 678 (1978).
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There is no federal nonreserved or riparian right in western waters.
Congress does have the power to authorize federal appropria-
tion of western waters, state law notwithstanding. Congress has not
done so expressly. Whether it has done so implicitly calls for appli-
cation of principles of the modern federal common law. Such an
application refutes the Interior Department Solicitor's assertion
that nonreserved rights exist. Uniform rules are not required
merely because a federal right is at issue. There must be a demon-
strated need for uniformity. The Solicitor has as yet made no such
demonstration, and analysis of several statutes shows that Con-
gress has chosen a flexible approach to federal water use, allowing
adaptation to nonuniform local laws and conditions.
Given the consistent congressional policy of deference to state
regulation of water rights, the nonreserved right could be justified
only by a showing that a uniform rule of federal appropriation was
necessary to effectuate important federal interests, and that pri-
vate rights and state interests would not be disrupted. Absent such
a showing, and unless Congress acts, no court should recognize a
federal nonreserved right.
Barry C. Vaughan
